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On June 14, 1946, Bernard Baruch, the 
American representative to the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission, presented the United States’ plan 
for international control of atomic technology at the 
commission’s inaugural meeting.i With World War II 
having ended less than a year prior, the United States 
and the Soviet Union were drifting into a period of 
geopolitical tension that would soon become known as 
the Cold War. At the time, the United States had a 
monopoly over atomic weapons; the Soviet Union 
would not test its first until 1949.ii 
Baruch prefaced his speech with a somber 
warning of the importance of the moment: “Behind the 
black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, 
seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we 
fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of 
fear. Let us not deceive ourselves; we must elect world 
peace or world destruction.”iii Following this dramatic 
opening, Baruch introduced his proposal, which 
recommended the creation of an Atomic Development 
Authority to oversee the use of atomic energy and to 
inspect atomic facilities to ensure they were used 
solely for peaceful purposes. He based his plan on the 
recommendations of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, 
issued in March 1946 by a State Department advisory 
committee headed by Dean Acheson, Under Secretary 
of State, and David Lilienthal, Chairman of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. However, Baruch’s 
proposal differed from that report in that he charged 
the United Nations Security Council with enforcing the 
plan by using sanctions to punish nations that violated 
it. Controversially, he proposed that in regards to 
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In 1946, Bernard Baruch, the American representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, introduced the United 
States’ proposal for international control of atomic energy, known as the Baruch Plan. It suggested a regime under which the 
United Nations would enforce an international ban on atomic weapons. The proposal, which stated that the United States would 
destroy its atomic arsenal only once the plan were fully implemented, was blocked in the United Nations by the Soviet Union. This 
paper argues that domestic public opinion played a significant role in the development, negotiation, and failure of the plan, but that 
the sentiments of the public were partly shaped by Baruch at the same time. Public opinion affected the formulation of the 
proposal, which Baruch based in part on what he believed the American populace favored. By helping discourage negotiations, 







Rezvani: The Baruch Plan and American Public Opinion
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2020
   
        YURJ | yurj.yale.edu                     
Social Sciences 
   2  
 
     Hum nities | International Law                               VOL. 1.1 | Oct. 2020 
atomic matters, all members of the Security Council 
should forfeit their veto power. Additionally, Baruch 
declared that only once the plan were fully 
implemented would the United States destroy its 
atomic arsenal. Because the Soviet Union strongly 
opposed both of these requirements and the plan’s 
passage required unanimous approval in the Security 
Council, disagreement on these two provisions was the 
proximate cause of the failure of the proposal, which 
came to be known as the Baruch Plan.iv 
Public interest in, and media coverage of, the 
plan was widespread given the exceptionally high 
stakes involved. Combined with the importance that 
Baruch himself placed on the attitudes of the American 
people, this led public opinion to play a significant part 
in the rise and fall of the plan. This paper examines the 
extent of that role. Because Baruch formulated the 
contents of the plan in part based on his perception of 
the populace’s beliefs, public opinion helped shape the 
development of the plan. Public sentiments also 
reinforced Baruch’s confidence in the proposal and 
contributed to his intransigent refusal to alter its 
elements. Consequently, public opinion was partly 
responsible for the ultimate fate of the plan because it 
encouraged Baruch to rule out the possibility of 
negotiations. Public opinion thus played a considerable 
role in the development of the Baruch Plan, helped 
engender a dearth of negotiation, and indirectly 
contributed to the failure of the proposal. 
 Domestic public sentiments guided the 
development of the plan. In the immediate aftermath of 
World War II, it was evident that the American public 
wished that their government continue to maintain 
exclusive control over atomic secrets and the bombs 
they bore. In a September 1945 poll conducted by the 
National Opinion Research Center (NORC), 85% of 
respondents stated that they wanted the United States 
government to keep secret the information that led to 
the development of atomic weapons.v In the same poll, 
respondents were asked what country they thought was 
most likely to attack the United States with an atomic 
weapon in the future. A plurality, 36%, believed the 
Soviet Union posed the greatest threat, followed by 
Japan at 25% and Germany at 16%.vi Despite the war 
having ended just weeks earlier, Americans were 
already more suspicious of their erstwhile ally than of 
their recently-defeated enemies. 
But by the beginning of 1946, Americans’ 
views on international atomic control seemed to have 
tempered somewhat. Public attitudes softened as the 
extreme vigilance that accompanied the war receded 
and post-war demobilization took effect. In a poll 
conducted by NORC in March 1946, 72% said they 
would support action by the United Nations prohibiting 
production of atomic bombs anywhere in the world if 
the United Nations were given the power to enforce 
this ban. Of this 72%, 78% were in favor of the ban 
even if it would require the destruction of all extant 
atomic bombs.vii Americans seemed not to be bent on 
ensuring that their nation maintained its atomic 
weapons, but rather open to a proposal for international 
control of atomic energy, provided that it would be 
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enforceable. However, the observation that Americans’ 
attitudes towards international atomic control had 
softened must be qualified with the fact that at the 
same time, an April 1946 poll by the American 
Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) demonstrated that a 
majority, 61%, still wanted the United States to 
continue manufacturing atomic bombs.viii This series of 
polls indicated that most Americans favored strong 
enforcement mechanisms, were suspicious of the 
Soviet Union, and wanted 
the United States to 
maintain, or even expand, its 
atomic arsenal in the 
meantime while an 
international plan for atomic 
control was still developing. 
These views 
persisted over the course of 
the year. A November 1946 
AIPO poll indicated 
continued opposition to 
unilateral cessation of production and destruction of 
existing atomic weapons. Distrust of the Soviet Union 
seemed to lie at the heart of these beliefs; 72% of 
respondents stated that they did not believe that, were 
the United States to unilaterally disarm, the Soviets 
would then agree to allow a United Nations committee 
to verify that they were not producing atomic weapons 
either.ix But despite being opposed to unilateral 
disarmament, Americans still seemed open to the 
notion of an international ban enforced by the United 
Nations. When asked in a September 1946 NORC poll 
whether the United States should “try to keep ahead of 
other countries by making more and better atomic 
bombs” or “make the United Nations organization 
strong enough to prevent all countries, including the 
United States, from making atomic bombs,” two-thirds 
of respondents chose the latter option.x 
Baruch was acutely aware of public opinion 
and considered winning over the public to be important 
for securing an enforceable 
agreement on international atomic 
control. In a speech he gave to a 
meeting of the United Jewish 
Appeal in February 1946, four 
months before presenting the plan, 
he stated, “Public opinion cannot 
be bought, but it can be deserved. 
A people who are eyed 
suspiciously must live so as to be 
the more deserving – not by 
cringing; not by handwashing; not 
by appeasement, for these have always failed, but by 
keeping our heads up and our shoulders back, ready to 
help and to lead in those causes that build mankind.” 
He also urged that American military dominance and 
international leadership were key to maintaining world 
peace: “Don’t let us be the first to disarm! … Don’t let 
us dodge the duty which lies upon us of helping to 
keep the world’s peace. We must be strong!”xi  
Baruch’s speech suggests that he was keenly 
attuned to public sentiments. Furthermore, his criticism 
“This series of polls 
indicated that most 
Americans favored strong 
enforcement mechanisms, 
were suspicious of the 
Soviet Union, and wanted 
the United States to 
maintain, or even expand, 
its atomic arsenal…” 
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of unilateral disarmament and appeasement, though not 
unique in the post-war period, foreshadowed later 
statements in which he denounced proposed 
modifications of his plan as appeasement of the 
Soviets that would be received negatively by the 
American people. Baruch delivered this address in 
front of supporters of the United Jewish Appeal, a 
Jewish philanthropic group that raised funds to support 
Jews in Europe and Palestine. He shrewdly connected 
past appeasement of Nazi Germany to possible future 
appeasement of the Soviet Union, thereby constructing 
an analogy that he used to paint a negative picture of 
the Soviet Union in the minds of the American Jews he 
addressed. 
In the months following this speech, Baruch 
carefully crafted the contents of his proposal, in part 
based on what he believed the American public would 
consider conducive to international security. He 
described his thinking in a memo to President Truman 
on June 6, 1946, eight days before he presented the 
plan at the United Nations. Given the intended 
audience of the document, it serves as an especially 
revealing source indicating Baruch’s views on the role 
of public opinion. Unlike in a speech, in this classified 
communication Baruch did not intend to impress a 
broader audience; rather, he directly addressed the 
President (with an expectation of privacy) in hopes of 
convincing Truman of the need to provide the 
populace with a practical proposal. Baruch wrote he 
was “deeply convinced” that “any expression which 
falls short of bringing a sense of security and a sense of 
truth to the public would be a gigantic error. … That 
policy is to set a goal for which we should strive.” 
Hinting at the United States’ impending loss of its 
atomic monopoly and underscoring the urgency of 
enacting an effectual plan, Baruch warned that “our 
secrets are not as secret as we think they are.” He 
emphasized that above all the proposal must include 
the possibility of enforcement, ranging from an initial 
punishment, sanctions, to the ultimate penalty, war: 
“[Here] lies the essential difference between the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report and my own position.” 
Whereas the former constituted a mere “basis of 
negotiations,” the latter provided “a formula of a 
secure peace.”  
 Baruch’s memo also emphasized the 
importance of “bringing to the attention of the 
American people … the necessity of adding 
enforcement,” suggesting that he favored a two-way 
relationship between himself and public opinion.xii He 
expressed that while the contents of the proposal 
should fit the wishes of the public, the former should 
also suggest to the latter what to prioritize. 
Furthermore, archival evidence indicates it is 
possible that Baruch utilized his connections in the 
news media to obtain favorable coverage. In an 
October 1948 telegram to Under Secretary of State 
Robert Lovett, Baruch discussed his secret 
collaboration with editors. The message concerned the 
American press’s response to comments that the Soviet 
permanent representative to the United Nations, Andrei 
Vishinsky, made during continuing United Nations 
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debate over international control of atomic energy. 
Vishinsky pushed for immediate American atomic 
disarmament and argued that the United States’ refusal 
to cease production of atomic bombs indicated it was 
preparing for a war against the Soviet Union. Baruch’s 
telegram read in part, 
As to stimulating sentiment on the soundness of 
the American position and supporting it in the 
face of the attacks made by Vishinsky, that is 
already under way. No sooner had I heard … 
than I began to work with various elements of 
the press and radio so that the American 
position would be strongly supported by 
American public opinion. That effort is already 
bearing fruit. Editorials of the type that the 
Herald Tribune printed yesterday, Tuesday, 
and reprinted in Paris, Wednesday, are being 
published throughout America. So are 
supporting commentaries on the air. The 
counter-propaganda is well under way.xiii 
 
Token discussion of the possibility of international 
control of atomic energy was ongoing at the time, 
despite the fact that the Baruch Plan’s failure to pass 
the Security Council two years prior had made the 
issue effectively moot. Nonetheless, the telegram 
informs analysis of the link between public opinion 
and the Baruch Plan by indicating that Baruch was 
both able and willing to deploy his connections in the 
media to produce favorable editorials. While the 
document concerned counter-propaganda that Baruch 
disseminated well after his plan had already failed, it 
also suggests the possibility that he may have done so 
during the time when it was still a live proposal. 
Although it was probable that the editors involved 
truthfully expressed their beliefs, clearly they were not 
neutral observers; rather, they consciously attempted to 
shape public opinion, with some of them spurred to do 
so by Baruch. In this sense, although the attitudes of 
the public constrained Baruch’s behavior, he also 
utilized his influence to sway public sentiments. 
When he presented his plan at the first meeting 
of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on 
June 14, 1946, Baruch claimed that global public 
opinion provided him with a mandate. Before an 
international audience, he declared, “In this crisis, we 
represent not only our governments but … the peoples 
of the world. We must remember that the peoples do 
not belong to the governments but that the 
governments belong to the peoples. We must answer 
their demands; we must answer the world’s longing for 
peace and security.” He went on: “Public opinion 
supports a world movement toward security. If I read 
the signs alright, the peoples want a program not 
composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable 
sanctions – an international law with teeth in it.”xiv 
Baruch’s words suggest that public opinion played a 
major role in the development of the plan, as he 
specifically cited the opinion of “the peoples” in his 
justification for the inclusion of enforcement 
provisions, echoing the message of his June 6 memo to 
Truman. 
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 American public opinion also played a notable 
role in the negotiation process, or the lack thereof. 
Early on, even before presenting his plan, Baruch 
realized the possible adverse impact that the public’s 
understanding of official government policy might 
have had on the strength of the United States’ 
negotiating position. In a March 1946 letter to 
President Truman, Baruch deplored the public release 
of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, as he felt that the 
close association of the committee with the State 
Department gave the impression that the report was 
official government policy. He wrote, “This situation 
has been brought very forcibly to my attention by the 
press announcements of the [Acheson-Lilienthal 
Report]. I do not underestimate the effect of this 
publication in the United States or in the world at 
large. … This brings the report pretty close to the 
category of the United States Government policy.” 
Baruch’s concerns about this issue were serious 
enough that he asked Truman to “postpone any action 
on confirmation of my appointment until I have had a 
little more time to think things over.”xv Baruch seemed 
determined to ensure that he, not Acheson, Lilienthal, 
or another member of their committee, would be the 
one shaping policy and thus public opinion regarding 
the government’s position.   
Opinion polls conducted shortly after Baruch 
introduced his proposal reflected broad support among 
Americans for the elements of the plan. A newspaper 
article from July 1946 reported the results of a poll 
about the inspection system proposed by Baruch; the 
New Journal and Guide cited a NORC poll showing 
that 75% of respondents favored Baruch’s inspection 
regime when it was described to them (though they 
were not asked about the plan by name given that it 
was not yet widely known).xvi Another NORC poll, 
conducted in September 1946, showed that 65% of 
those polled believed the best course of action to 
preserve peace would be to strengthen the United 
Nations so it could enforce a ban on atomic bombs.xvii 
In a November 1946 poll by AIPO, the majority of 
respondents opposed unilateral disarmament. 
Specifically, 65% disagreed with the suggestion that 
“the United States should stop making atom bombs 
and destroy those already made to prove our good 
intentions in asking for international control of atomic 
bombs.”xviii This finding was affirmed by a Gallup poll 
published on December 26, 1946, just four days before 
the Security Council voted down the Baruch Plan. The 
Atlanta Constitution reported the results of that poll, 
which found that 72% of Americans surveyed said the 
United States should not cease production of atomic 
bombs and destroy its existing arsenal. The article 
commented, “Public sentiment continues to oppose a 
Russian suggestion that, to show our good faith in 
international disarmament, we stop making atom 
bombs and destroy those already on hand.”xix  
Polls like these indicated that in the weeks and 
months before the final vote on the Baruch Plan, the 
American public seemed to support inspections, which 
were part of the plan, and opposed unilateral 
disarmament, which was part of the Soviet Union’s 
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counter-proposal, the Gromyko Plan. That proposal, 
named for Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations 
Andrei Gromyko, was in many ways the antithesis of 
the Baruch Plan. It called for immediate American 
atomic disarmament and eventual international atomic 
control, with no international role in verification, no 
sanctions or other enforcement, and preservation of 
Security Council members’ ability to veto resolutions 
on atomic matters.xx 
 Although the aforementioned polls may give 
the impression of widespread American support for the 
Baruch Plan, they should not necessarily be construed 
as evidence of such a consensus. In fact, public 
awareness of the Baruch Plan shortly after it was 
introduced was quite low. In a June 1946 NORC poll, 
only 29% said that they had heard or read about it.xxi 
Awareness of the plan had increased by early 1947, but 
the majority of the public remained unfamiliar with it; 
a February 1947 NORC poll found that 45% of 
respondents had heard or read about the plan.xxii 
While the available evidence makes it difficult 
to definitively determine the influence (relative to 
other factors) that public opinion had on the 
breakdown of negotiations or to prove a causal link, 
evidently the sentiments of the public constituted a 
significant factor. Baruch’s awareness of polls showing 
that the American populace favored the elements of his 
plan over those of the Gromyko Plan likely 
strengthened his confidence and may have encouraged 
him to remain obstinate in his rejection of the latter 
proposal. Baruch’s deputy Frederick Osborn indicated 
as much in a letter to Lewis Douglas, the American 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Osborn wrote, 
“Any serious weakening of the proposals would not 
only be unacceptable to the United States Government, 
but also to American public opinion. … It seems clear 
that any attempt to ‘mediate’ between the United 
States and the Soviet now … would be resented by the 
American public as an attempt at appeasement.”xxiii 
This specific mention of appeasement harkened back 
to Baruch’s speech to the United Jewish Appeal and 
revealed a dynamic in which Baruch both attempted to 
mobilize the public against appeasement at one point, 
and then later cited this same aversion to appeasement 
felt by the public to justify his decision not to negotiate 
with the Soviets. Clearly, Baruch and his team were 
keenly aware of public opinion and understood that if 
they weakened inspection and enforcement provisions, 
or pushed up the United States’ hypothetical atomic 
disarmament date, they would risk alienating the 
American people. Like Baruch’s aforementioned 
memo to Truman, Osborn’s letter was classified, 
increasing its reliability as a source given the relatively 
high likelihood that it accurately reflected the thinking 
of Baruch and his team. 
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Truman himself stated that Baruch placed 
much importance on public opinion. In his 1956 
memoir Years of Trial and Hope, Truman wrote that 
Baruch “had, of course, full knowledge of the 
President’s responsibility for national policy. His 
concern, in my opinion, was really whether he would 
receive public recognition. He had always seen to it 
that his suggestions and recommendations, not always 
requested by the President, would be given 
publicity.”xxiv Given that 
Truman had frequent contact 
and candid conversations with 
Baruch, the book provides 
important insights into 
Baruch’s purpose and 
motivations. Baruch’s 
preoccupation with public 
opinion thus may have led him 
to prefer gaining the favor of 
the populace over seriously 
negotiating and obtaining an 
international pact. 
 Gregg Herken’s research reinforces the notion 
that public support for Baruch’s proposal bolstered his 
self-assurance. In The Winning Weapon, Herken wrote 
that Baruch gained a “public vote of confidence” from 
the reception his plan received. Herken explained that 
American reaction to the proposal was 
“overwhelmingly favorable,” citing a New York Times 
article that described it as “’thoughtful, imaginative, 
and courageous.’” Herken commented that most 
newspaper accounts were even more laudatory than 
this in their praise. He added, “Nor was Baruch 
unmindful of or indifferent to the paean of enthusiasm 
with which his plan was greeted. A survey of 
newspaper editorials by his staff claimed to show that 
98.5 percent of press opinion was favorable to the 
report.”xxv Baruch’s instruction to his staff to sample 
media coverage (despite possibly having influenced 
some of those editorial positions himself) indicates the 
value he placed on the 
sentiments of the populace. 
Herken’s analysis supports the 
idea that popular opinion was 
indirectly influential in the 
negotiations process, as positive 
reception of the proposal likely 
contributed to Baruch’s 
increasingly headstrong attitude 
and refusal to compromise on 
the terms of his plan. 
 Ultimately, the Soviet 
Union blocked the proposal in the United Nations 
Security Council. Two years later, in his book 
Uncommon Sense, Robert Oppenheimer reflected on 
the failure of the plan. Oppenheimer, who during the 
war had been director of the Manhattan Project, which 
produced the atomic bomb, was at this time chairman 
of the General Advisory Committee of the newly-
created United States Atomic Energy Commission. 
Expressing concern about the catastrophic potential of 
the weapons he had helped create, Oppenheimer stated 
“In his 1956 memoir Years 
of Trial and Hope, Truman 
wrote that Baruch ‘had, of 
course, full knowledge of 
the President’s 
responsibility for national 
policy. His concern, in my 
opinion, was really whether 
he would receive public 
recognition.’”  
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that it was impossible to know “in what context, and in 
what manner of the world, we may return again to the 
great issues touched on by the international control of 
atomic energy.” Yet he remained hopeful: “Even in the 
history of recent failure … we may discern the 
essential harmony, in a world where science has 
extended and deepened our understanding of the 
common sources of power for evil and power for good, 
of restraining the one and of fostering the other. This is 
seed we take with us, travelling to a land we cannot 
see, to plant in new soil.”xxvi But despite 
Oppenheimer’s eloquent optimism, the failure of the 
Baruch Plan spelled the end of any serious attempts at 
international control of atomic energy in the post-war 
period and paved the way for the atomic arms race of 
the Cold War. 
 Declassified government documents, paired 
with contemporary polling data and media 
publications, demonstrate that public opinion played a 
significant role in the development, negotiation, and 
eventual failure of the Baruch Plan. Its author devised 
its contents in part based on his perception of public 
opinion. The sentiments of the public also affected 
negotiations by helping solidify Baruch’s refusal to 
compromise with the Soviet Union, thereby 
contributing to the ultimate fate of the plan. This case 
is noteworthy due to the fact the destructive capability 
of atomic weapons raised the stakes of the Baruch talks 
to a level unseen in any prior arms control negotiations 
in history. Additionally, this case sheds light on the 
complex relationship between elites and public 
opinion, in which the former actively shapes the latter, 
while the latter constrains the behavior of the former. It 
also serves as an example of the role that domestic 
affairs play in the two-level game of international arms 
control; public opinion has the potential to influence 
arms control proposals, negotiations, and outcomes.  
9
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